Tag Archives: Greece

Could the US Default?

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One claim that I often hear around the blogs and tweets is that the US could never default because it borrows in its own currency. Greece defaulted because it borrows in Euros, and other EU countries have strong objections to the ECB printing money to pay off Greece’s debts. However, when the US debt comes due, the worst case scenario is that the Fed prints up the funds to pay off the debt. Problem solved.

I don’t think the US monetary-political system works that way at all. Let’s run through some back-of-the-envelope calculations. According to Wikipedia, before Greece’s default, it owed around €350 billion; the default constituted a €107 billion reduction in debt. Let’s call that ratio 30%.

Let’s suppose that the US had to print enough money to weather a Greek-style crisis. Could it cover 30% of its outstanding debt simply by printing the funds? According to the Treasury, as of last Friday, the US owes $10,820,230,118,370.38 to the public. To do so, it would have to print and introduce into circulation $3.25 trillion.

What would that do to the economy? According to FRED, as of last Wednesday, there are currently less than $1.1 trillion in circulation at the moment. So printing enough money to weather a Greek-style crisis would result in almost a quadrupling of the number of dollars in circulation. In the long run, if velocity is determined basically by technological factors, that means that we would expect prices to almost quadruple. This would represent a seizure of assets from holders of future nominal claims, which would be damaging to the economy. However, in the short run, the story is even worse. If I were concerned that the government was going to print $3 trillion, I would try to get rid of all my cash holdings and hoard real resources. So would everyone else. This could cause a hyperinflation even before the Fed starts printing money. Banks, too, would want to convert their nominal assets into real ones. And since real resources would be hoarded, they would not be available for use in investment projects. It would be an economic disaster.

If you want to salvage the hypothesis that the US could never default, you would make two points. First, the government need only credibly commit to printing money to pay off its debts if necessary. The fact that markets believe it would do so means that interest rates on Treasurys never get high and the fiscal burden of interest payments are bearable. Second, the economic effects of a default would also be pretty bad. Since an economic collapse is unavoidable either way, it is better if politicians credibly commit to printing the money if necessary.

However, I’m not sure that the government can credibly commit to printing instead of defaulting. Almost half of the US debt is held by foreigners. If you were a politician seeking reelection, would you not counter a proposal to inflate away $3.25 trillion of debt with a suggestion to default on debts held by foreigners? This would wreak economic havoc, but the worst damage would be borne by China and Japan, not by your own beloved constituents. I’m not saying this is a good idea, but to my mind the US political system, defective as it is, cannot credibly commit to not doing this.

The other factor that makes the situation worse for the US than for Greece is that Greece has an international consortium as a backstop to make credible loan guarantees. These guarantees are worth hundreds of billions of dollars. By no one can credibly guarantee the US’s trillions of dollars of loans. This means that while Greece’s crisis has played out as a slow and steady collapse, a US crisis would be more severe because it would happen much more suddenly.

My claim is not that the US is likely to default. Rather, my point is a narrow one: people who say that the US could never default because it borrows in its own currency are mistaken. They should either stop saying that or tell me why I’m wrong, which I would be happy to be.

Ireland Tells Us Nothing About Austerity

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In 2008, the Keynesians emerged from hiding, where they had been since the mid-1980s. It was nice to see them, catch up, and so on. But now they won’t go away.

This week’s Buttonwood column in The Economist considers whether fiscal austerity is expansionary or contractionary. A sentence caught my eye.

Keynesian economists are also likely to counter the Canadian example [in which fiscal austerity was followed by prosperity] with that of Ireland today, where a willingness to appease the bond markets with budget cuts has been accompanied by a fall in nominal GDP of almost a fifth.

Last week in the New York Times, Christy Romer’s debut column claimed:

Ireland, Greece and Spain have all had rising unemployment after moving to cut deficits.

OK, I can agree that Ireland, Greece, and Spain all cut their deficits, and that they all had rising unemployment. I will leave aside, for this post, the question of what their unemployment rate would have been if they had not appeased the bond market, because in the US context it is irrelevant. The US is not yet on the immediate verge of a sovereign debt crisis.

What is important in the US context? Ireland, Greece, and Spain differ from the US in a way that is so inescapably essential in theory that it makes me want to revoke the credentials of any economist who cites them as evidence. Yes, dear reader, you guessed it, none of them runs its own monetary policy.

The monetary authority moves last. It incorporates the actions of the fiscal authority into its choices. If the fiscal authority decides to be austere, the monetary authority can be loose. The friendly Keynesians who cite the experiences of countries without their own currencies as evidence of the evil of austerity during a recession are trying to trick you.

The Greek Bailout

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Officials from EU governments have just now pledged to bail out the Greek government. In my view, this is a bad idea, at least for the people of Germany and France, who will bear a lot of the cost. Since I am having some trouble organizing my thoughts into fluent paragraphs, I will present them as talking points.

  • The right model for thinking about the Greek government’s large and chronic deficits is the budgetary or fiscal commons. Richard Wagner says it well (in the context of the US government): “Most collective or corporate organizations, profit-seeking and nonprofit, do not suffer from continued deficits. What distinguishes the federal government from other corporate bodies is that the federal budgetary process illustrates the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The federal budgetary process is a natural product of common property budgeting, where choice is divorced from responsibility for the consequences of those choices.” Interest groups within Greece compete for tax revenue, knowing that if they abstain, someone else will benefit from their abstemiousness. This leads to “overgrazing” of the budgetary commons, or chronic deficits.
  • By bailing out Greece, other EU governments are extending the range of the commons. They are further divorcing choice and responsibility for decision-makers in Greece and in other profligate member governments.
  • A Greek default need not harm the Euro very much. The strength of the Euro depends most heavily on the willingness of the European Central Bank to keep inflation low, and much less on Greece’s finances. If Greece’s default causes a debt crisis in Spain, Italy, and Portugal, this could eventually weaken the Euro as the ECB would be expected to apply monetary stimulus. But letting Greece default could also force those other governments to take their finances more seriously, and in any case, the principle of triage applies to bailouts as well as medicine.
  • If the Greek government is not bailed out, as is my preference, things will sadly be very, very bad for Greece. Creditors of the Greek government would have to take a haircut; there would be no way around that. The Greek economy would suffer a long and deep depression. This would be painful for the Greek people, but the goal is to prevent something worse from happening down the road.
  • Greece should never have joined the Euro because they now have no control over monetary policy. When people discuss so-called “optimal currency areas” they rightly emphasize labor and capital mobility, and factors which affect these. Perhaps one underappreciated additional issue is fiscal responsibility. If one government in a currency union is relatively fiscally responsible and one is not, then the responsible one will always be called upon to bail out the irresponsible one. If the bailout occurs, this is bad because it extends the fiscal commons, as discussed above. But if the bailout does not occur, the irresponsible government is harmed by more than it would have been if it had its own currency and monetary policy. Note that this logic applies to currency pegs as well, as Argentina learned.
  • It is dangerous to anthropomorphize governments, but putting this concern aside, the right metaphor for better policy is not “austerity” but “enlightened self-interest.” The key question facing the Greek government is Can you solve the fiscal commons problem? Solving a commons problem is not about ascetic self-denial, but about far-sighted self-improvement: building the institutions that will make the country better off in the long run.
  • In general, I think it would be a good thing if investors looked at sovereign debt more skeptically. First, sovereign debt is subject to the “Black Swan” problem. Second, bond markets are one of the major constraints governments face. (As James Carville said, “I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.”) It would be better if the bond market intimidated the government sooner rather than later on the road to insolvency.
  • I worry a lot about a US sovereign debt crisis. With such a big economy, the fiscal commons problem is in many ways more severe. I think Congress could overcome the commons problem in order to avoid a debt crisis, but debt crises have a very quick onset. By the time people realize it is happening, it may be too late.