My profile at the Mercatus Center is here.

Forthcoming in Public Choice, and written with Alex Tabarrok, is “Public Choice and Bloomington School Perspectives on Intellectual Property.” The gist of the paper is that the standard case for intellectual property—that a temporary monopoly is needed in order to recoup the sunk costs of innovation or creation—ignores issues raised by the two schools we investigate. The paper was cited in the Wall Street Journal.

I contributed a chapter to Copyright Unbalanced: From Incentive to Excess, edited by Jerry Brito. My chapter is about how the New York Times paywall represents a weaker and more informal view of copyright enforcement.

Do High International Telecom Rates Buy Telecom Sector Growth: An Empirical Investigation of the Sender-Pays Rule” uses data from international telephone calls from 1992-2010 to show that Internet data transfer fees are unlikely to be used to finance growth in Internet infrastructure in the developing world. A write-up in Ars Technica.

My working paper, “Internet Security without Law: How Service Providers Create Order Online,” documents the informal institutions that incentivize ISPs to take action against malware, even though they have no formal legal liability for the damage it causes. Internet governance is pretty anarchical, and this is my first stab at writing about that fact.

Is there a Cybersecurity Market Failure?” is a readable primer on public economics for people interested in cybersecurity and tech policy more generally.

In September 2011 I traveled to Rwanda with the Legatum Institute to learn about its economic experience in the post-genocide period. Along with Dalibor Rohac and Hemal Shah, I wrote “Six Questions You Always Wanted to Ask about Africa, and Answers from Rwanda” to report our findings. Our study was written up in The Economist.

My dissertation is roughly on analytical anarchism; it can be thought of as a reply to Cowen, who I’m pleased to say is my advisor.

More information coming eventually.